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NOTES
PUTTING THE NEXUS INTO PUBLIC LAW 86-272
Scholars and policymakers frequently debate' the states' authority to
tax the net income of foreign corporations.2 This debate often centers on
Public Law 86-272.1 Congress enacted this legislation to exempt foreign
corporations from paying net income taxes in states where their activities
are limited to "solicitation". 4 Congress, however, failed to specify in the
statute when this exemption applies.5 By default, the state courts as-
sumed this burden.6 In determining when the "solicitation" exemption
applies, courts focus on the type of activities carried out by a foreign
corporation within the taxing state.7 Quite often, this emphasis on cate-
gorizing activities generates conflicting interpretations.' As a result, cor-
1. During the last quarter century, state governments increasingly have looked to corporations
as a source of needed tax revenues. C. McLURE, ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES ON STATE TAXATION
OF MULTUIURISDICTIONAL CORPORATIONS 7 (1986). The problem of generating revenues has be-
come especially acute under the Reagan Administration, with the relative decrease in the size of the
federal government. Of particular importance to the states is the authority to tax the net income of
foreign corporations engaged in interstate commerce.
Two primary issues are implicated when a state seeks to tax the net income of a foreign corpora-
tion. First, does the corporation have sufficient contacts with the taxing state to permit the state to
impose a tax? Second, assuming the state has authority to tax, how should the state "apportion" the
corporation's revenues to the activities carried out within the state? Tatarowicz, State Judicial and
Administrative Interpretations of U.S. Public Law 86-272, 38 TAX LAWYER 293, 294 (1985). This
Note focuses on the former; the latter is beyond the scope of this Note. In general, a corporation's
net income is "apportioned" (divided among states in which the corporation is engaged in business)
on the basis of the corporation's sales, property and payroll attributable to a particular state. For a
summary of the apportionment methods utilized by the states, see J. HELLERSTEIN, STATE TAXA-
TION (1983) [hereinafter HELLERSTEIN]; HARTMAN, FEDERAL LIMITS ON STATE AND LOCAL TAX-
ATION 9:16-9:29 (1981) [hereinafter HARTMAN].
2. For the purposes of this Note, a "foreign corporation" is defined as a business incorporated
in a state other than that seeking to impose the tax, which business does not maintain it's principal
place of business inside the taxing state, nor carry out sufficient activities within that state to require
it to be "qualified to do business," but which, nevertheless, engages in some business activities within
the taxing state. States generally tax the net income of foreign corporations as a measure of the
benefits the corporations derive from the state. See generally P. HARTMAN, STATE AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT TAXATION 63-64 (1953).
3. See infra note 58.
4. See infra notes 66-71 and accompanying text.
5. Tatarowicz, supra note 1, at 293.
6. Id.
7. See infra notes 63-71 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 72-74 and accompanying text.
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porations engaged in or contemplating multistate business operations
face uncertainty when speculating whether states' will tax their net
income.9
In contrast, foreign corporations seemingly face little uncertainty
when anticipating whether a state will tax their gross receipts.10 In the
absence of legislation, the Supreme Court has developed rudimentary
guidelines for reviewing the legality of a state's gross receipts tax. 1 The
Court looks to see whether a sufficient "nexus" exists between the foreign
corporation and a taxing state.12 Specifically, the Court allows the tax if
the corporation's activities as a whole constitute an established market
within the state.1 3 Unlike the state court decisions under Public Law 86-
272, the Court's nexus analysis does not focus on the type of activities
carried out by the foreign corporation. Thus, the Court avoids the ambi-
guity inherent in categorizing activities.
This Note calls for Congress to amend Public Law 86-272's analysis of
state net income taxes by incorporating the nexus test that the Supreme
Court uses for state gross receipts taxes. Part I reviews the history of the
states' authority to impose a net income tax on foreign corporations and
the state court interpretations under Public Law 86-272. Part II exam-
9. In the words of one commentator, "The unfortunate result ... is that taxpayers are left
without an intelligible standard to follow in planning their multistate activities so as to minimize
their tax and administrative burdens." Tatarowicz, supra note 1, at 324-35. One noted scholar
describes the problem of states' authority to tax the net income of corporations engaged exclusively
in interstate commerce as "a riddle wrapped in an enigma inside a mystery." Sweeney, State Taxa-
tion of Interstate Commerce Under Public Law 86-272:"A Riddle Wrapped in an Enigma Inside a
Mystery," 1984 B.Y.U. L. Rav. 169, 170 n.5 (1984) (quoting Rep. Emanuel Celler, 105 CONG. REC.
17, 771 (1959)).
Corporations engaged in interstate commerce face the burden of paying taxes in multiple states, as
well as keeping abreast of the intricacies of multiple state tax laws. This latter burden may prove to
be the more cumbersome, as the time and expense of preparing the tax returns in numerous states
may outweigh the incremental income derived from interstate operations. For additional commen-
tary regarding the uncertainty faced by corporations engaged in interstate operations see Sweeney,
supra at 169; HELLERSTEIN, supra note 1, 1 6.8-.18.
10. For the purposes of this Note, "gross receipts" tax is defined as one imposed by a State on
every dollar of sales derived by a foreign corporation from activities carried out within the taxing
State.
Prior to 1976, the Supreme Court repeatedly refused to permit the states to tax the gross receipts
of a foreign corporation. See infra notes 78-108 and accompanying text. Subsequent to 1976, for-
eign corporations have faced little uncertainty regarding the applicability of a state's gross receipts
tax, arguably because the Court has articulated a clear standard for reviewing the legality of such a
tax. See infra notes 119-28 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 119-22 and accompanying text.
12. Id.
13. Id.
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ines the Supreme Court's treatment of state gross receipts taxes and sum-
marizes the nexus test adopted by the Court. Part III proposes that
Congress amend Public Law 86-272 to incorporate the nexus analysis.
I. TAXING CORPORATE NET INCOME
A. The Early Focus: Whether States May Tax Corporate Income
Derived Exclusively from Interstate Commerce?
The states' authority to tax the net income of foreign corporations
evolved from a series of Supreme Court decisions beginning in 1918. In
Peck & Co. v. Lowe 14 the Court upheld a federal tax imposed on domes-
tic corporations' net income derived from international commerce."5
Peck & Co., a domestic corporation engaged in buying goods in the states
and reselling them in foreign countries, challenged the tax as unconstitu-
tionally taxing the exportation of goods. 6 In upholding the tax, the
Court stated that the Constitution prohibited only taxes imposed directly
on the exportation process. 17 Because this net income tax applied at the
conclusion of the exportation process, the Court viewed it as a mere indi-
rect tax on the exportation of goods, and therefore legitimate.18
In United States Glue Co. v. Oak Creek '9 the Court broadened Peck &
Co. to permit states to tax net income of domestic corporations engaged
in interstate commerce.20 United objected to a Wisconsin tax on the
14. 247 U.S. 165 (1918).
15. Id. at 175. The Federal government subjected every domestic corporation to a tax on a
specified per centum of its "entire net income arising or accruing from all sources during the preced-
ing calendar year." Act of October 3, 1913, c. 16, section II, 38 Stat. 166, 172.
16. The corporation based its challenge on article 1, § 9 which includes in part: "No Tax or
Duty shall be laid on Articles exported from any State. .. " U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9, cl. 5.
17. 247 U.S. at 175.
18. Id. The Peck Court interpreted the Constitution as banning all taxes imposed during the
exportation process. While the Court did not define when this process began and ended, it did
indicate that taxes levied on activities leading up to exportation (such as a manufacturing tax levied
on the value of goods produced in the state) were exempt from the prohibition, as were taxes im-
posed on post-exportation results (i.e., net income). The Court held that a net income tax "is levied
after exportation is completed, after all expenses are paid and losses adjusted, and after the recipient
of the income is free to use it as he chooses." Id. This holding explained the Court's early distinc-
tion between net income taxes and gross receipts taxes imposed on revenues derived by corporations
while engaging in business that crossed the state's borders. The Court upheld the net income tax for
the aforementioned reason, yet deemed illegal the gross receipts taxes because they were imposed
while goods were still in the exportation process.
19. 247 U.S. 321 (1918).
20. Id. at 329.
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company's net income,2 ' which included receipts from the sale of goods
in interstate commerce.22 The company contended that Wisconsin's tax
amounted to an unconstitutional interference with commerce between
the states.2' The Court rejected this challenge, holding that Wisconsin's
tax entailed only "indirect" and "incidental" burdens on interstate
commerce.
2 4
Applying the United States Glue rationale, the California Supreme
Court, in West Publishing Co. v. McClogan25 held that a state may "un-
questionably" tax the income of a foreign corporation engaged exclu-
sively in interstate commerce.26 West, a Minnesota based publisher,
employed representatives in California to solicit orders, collect payments
and handle customer complaints.27  The company bartered for office
21. Id. at 323. United States Glue had its principle place of business in Wisconsin. The State of
Wisconsin sought to "apportion" (see supra note 1) the company's net income on the basis of activi-
ties carried out within the state. United States Glue contended that its net income was derived
exclusively from interstate commerce, and therefore, that a state could not subject the income to
apportionment.
22. Id. at 325-26.
23. Id. at 323. See supra note 21.
24. Id. at 329. The Court's holding refined the distinction noted earlier in Peck & Co. regarding
the legality of the net income tax versus the gross receipts tax. In Peck & Co., the Court distin-
guished the taxes on the basis of the "direct" burden the gross receipts tax imposed on the "exporta-
tion process." See supra note 18. In United States Glue Co. the Court also focused on the direct
versus indirect nature of the burdens imposed by the respective taxes on interstate commerce. Un-
like the Peck & Co. Court, however, this Court articulated the burden in terms of inhibiting com-
merce between the states. The Court felt that the gross receipts tax placed an immediate deterrent
on businesses engaged in interstate commerce, and that the tax was therefore illegal. In contrast, the
state imposed the net income tax after the interstate transactions were completed, and after the
corporation had derived a profit. In this situation, the Court found no unconstitutional interference
with interstate commerce by the statute. 247 U.S. at 328. This distinction by the Court in its treat-
ment of state net income taxes and gross receipts taxes remained intact until the Court's decision in
Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602 (1951). For further discussion of Spector see
infra note 101.
25. 27 Cal. 2d 705, 166 P.2d 861, aff'd per curiain, 328 U.S. 823 (1946).
26. 27 Cal. 2d at 715, 166 P.2d at 867.
27. 27 Cal. 2d at 705, 166 P.2d at 862. Because West was neither incorporated nor had its
principle place of business in California, this case is distinguishable on the facts from Peck & Co. and
United States Glue Co. See supra notes 13-21 and accompanying text. As such, the Court's decision
to uphold the tax underscores the development of the states' taxing authority since these earlier
decisions. Both Peck & Co. and United States Glue Co. had their principle places of business in the
state imposing the tax. The issue in those cases was whether the state could tax revenues derived
outside the state by domestic corporations. In contrast, in West Publishing Co., California sought to
tax the net income of a "foreign corporation": a business incorporated in Minnesota, and not "quali-
fied" (see supra note 1) to do business within California. California's argument for imposing the tax
was that West had engaged in substantial income-producing activities within California which were
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol66/iss3/6
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space in California, but did not lease or own real property in the State.28
West refused to file net income tax returns in California. The company
alleged that California's tax unfairly burdened interstate commerce and
denied West due process.2 9 Speaking for a unanimous court, Justice
Traynor cited considerable Supreme Court precedent to find that Califor-
nia's net income tax only indirectly affected interstate commerce. 30 The
court also rejected West's due process challenge.31 Concluding that the
state provided a market in which West was able to engage in substantial
income-producing activities, the court held that these activities fairly
subjected the company to taxation within the state.32
B. The Modern Focus: Whether a Corporation has Sufficient Contacts
with the Taxing State to Subject it to the State's
Net Income Tax?
The early Court decisions focused on whether a state could tax the net
income of foreign corporations engaged in activities within the state.33
made possible because of the benefits provided by the state (eg., a court system, protection of per-
sons and property, and a transportation system).
28. 27 Cal. 2d at 707, 166 P.2d at 862.
29. 27 Cal. 2d at 708-09, 166 P.2d at 863, West contended the tax violated the due process
clauses on the grounds that the state did not furnish such "protection, opportunities or benefits that
would justify a tax." 27 Cal. 2d at 713, 166 P.2d at 866.
30. Id. The court reiterated the distinction between net income taxes and gross receipts taxes
developed in United States Glue Co. v. Oak Creek. See supra note 26.
31. 27 Cal. 2d at 713-15, 166 P.2d at 866-67.
32. Id. The court quoted extensively from the Supreme Court's decision in International Shoe
Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 321 (1945), in finding that West's activities established such a
"presence" as to "subject it alike to taxation by the state and to suit to recover the tax." Specifically,
the court found that California provided a market in which West competed with local publishers, the
same protection for West's agents as agents carrying on business activities for a principal engaged in
intrastate commerce, and a court system in which West could enforce payment for the sale of its
publications.
Interestingly, the California Supreme Court's focus on the "substantiality" of West's activities is
virtually identical to the test that the Supreme Court subsequently adopted for reviewing the legality
of the gross receipts tax. See Complete Auto Transit v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1976); and Tyler Pipe
Inds. v. Dept. of Revenue, 107 S. Ct. 2810 (1987). For further discussion see infra notes 111-27 and
accompanying text. The Court in Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S.
450 (1959), also focused on the "substantiality" of a foreign corporation's activities in upholding a
net income tax. See infra notes 36-45 and accompanying text. This focus on the corporation's activ-
ities as a whole, however, disappeared from the Court's language when Congress enacted Public Law
86-272 in 1959, see infra notes 58-75 and accompanying text, and did not resurface until Complete
Auto Transit in 1976, see infra notes 111-20 and accompanying text.
33. See supra notes 14-32 and accompanying text.
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With this issue answered in the affirmative by West Publishing,34 the
courts and Congress turned their attention to the question of whether a
corporation has sufficient contacts within a State to subject it to state
taxation.35
1. Nexus Under Northwestern
In Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota36 the
Supreme Court identified a pattern of activity which justly subjected the
foreign corporation to Minnesota's net income tax.37 In that case,
Northwestern, an Iowa corporation, limited its activities in Minnesota to
the regular solicitation of orders for the sale of its cement products. 38
These orders were transmitted to Iowa for acceptance and, if approved,
were filled and delivered from Iowa.39 To further the solicitation pro-
cess, Northwestern maintained a leased sales office in Minnesota.40
However, the company did not own real estate in Minnesota and did not
warehouse merchandise in the state.41 The Court nonetheless upheld
Minnesota's power to tax Northwestern. The Court found that the tax
was not discriminatory and that the state properly apportioned the tax to
local activities within the tax state.4 2 The Court's analysis concentrated
on finding a sufficient nexus between the taxing state and the corpora-
34. See supra text accompanying notes 25-32.
35. A 1940 Supreme Court decision provided a framework for this analysis. In Wisconsin v.
J.C. Penney, 311 U.S. 435 (1940), the Court acknowledged that corporations must pay to engage in
commerce within a state. The Court held that to determine when a state may justifiably impose a
tax, courts must simply ask "whether the state has given anything for which it can ask [a] return."
Id. at 444. While this question is helpful because it provides a framework to determine if a corpora-
tion's contacts with a state are sufficient to justify taxation, it leaves unanswered the more difficult
question of exactly what conduct justifies taxation.
36. 358 U.S. 450 (1959). The court decided this case together with Williams, State Revenue
Commissioner v. Stockham Valves & Fittings. 213 Ga. 713, 101 S.E.2d 197 (1958). Because the
facts of the consolidated cases are virtually identical, all references in this Note are to the facts of
Northwestern States.
37. The Court in Northwestern boldly set out to reduce the confusion and controversy that had
developed in the wake of some three hundred opinions regarding the taxing power of the states.
Northwestern States, 358 U.S. at 457-58. The Court accredited this "quagmire" to Congress "not
having undertaken to regulate taxation [between the States] ... and the states having understandably
persisted in their efforts to get some return for the substantial benefits they have afforded [interstate
commerce]." Id. at 457. Despite this admirable objective, the decision in Northwestern States
sparked a tremendous backlash in Congress. See infra notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
38. Id. at 454.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 452.
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tion.43 The Court found such a nexus because Northwestern maintained
an office in Minnesota and engaged in regular "solicitation" within the
state.44
A liberal reading of Northwestern States suggests that any state could
tax a foreign corporation that carries out regular "solicitation". 45 This
position gained further credibility when the Court denied certiorari for
two state Supreme Court cases involving Louisiana's corporate net in-
come tax.46 In Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. Collector of Revenue47
and International Shoe Co. v. Fontenot4" the Louisiana Supreme Court
extended the state's power to tax the interstate income of foreign corpo-
rations. Both Brown-Forman and International Shoe maintained repre-
sentatives in Louisiana.49 The representatives for International Shoe
were responsible for soliciting product orders,5° while the representatives
in Brown-Forman assisted wholesale customers with product market-
ing.51 Neither corporation maintained property in Louisiana, authorized
its salesmen to accept or reject orders, or made its deliveries from inside
the state. Yet, the Louisiana Court sustained the tax.52 Several scholars
have argued that by denying certiorari for these two cases, the Supreme
Court implicitly validated state taxes on foreign corporations whenever
the corporations engaged in repeated solicitation within the state.5 3
2. Congressional Reaction: Public Law 86-2 72
(the "'Solicitation Law")
The Court's decision in Northwestern States, coupled with its subse-
quent denial of certiorari in Brown-Forman and International Shoe,
43. Id. at 464. The Court looked to the "vigorous and continuous sales campaigns" carried out
in the taxing states as evidence of a sufficient nexus to justify the state imposing a tax. Id. at 464-65.
These campaigns included "the usual sales activities ... regular solicitation, receipt and forwarding
of orders ... and the promotion of business and good will." Id. at 456.
44. Sweeney, supra note 9, at 171.
45. See, eg., Hartman, Solicitation and Delivery Under P.L 86-272: An Unchartered Course, 29
VAND. L. Rav. 353, 358 (1976).
46. Id.
47. 234 La. 651, 101 So.2d 70 (1958), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 28 (1959).
48. 236 La. 279, 107 So.2d 640 (1959), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 984 (1959).
49. Brown-Forman, 231 La. at 653, 101 So. 2d at 72; International Shoe, 236 La. at 289, 106 So.
2d at 640.
50. International Shoe, 236 La. at 280, 107 So. 2d at 640.
51. Brown-Forman, 231 La. at 653-54, 101 So. 2d at 70.
52. Brown-Forman, 231 La. at 659, 101 So. 2d at 72; International Shoe, 236 La. at 282, 107 So.
2d at 641.
53. See supra note 49. See also Tatarowicz, supra note 1, at 296.
1988]
Washington University Open Scholarship
602 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 66:595
prompted a sharp reaction from the business community.5 4 Corporate
leaders lobbied Congress for minimum jurisdictional standards to limit
the states' power to tax the net income of interstate corporations."
Small and moderate sized corporations in particular contended that the
expense of keeping abreast of numerous state tax laws would chill their
interest in interstate operations. 6
Congress responded swiftly by enacting Public Law 86-272.17 Voted
into law less than a year after the Courts decision in Northwestern States,
Congress enacted the statute as a "stopgap" measure until it could de-
velop more comprehensive guidelines.18
54. Tatarowicz, supra note 1, at 296; Sweeney, supra note 9, at 172. See also State Taxation of
Interstate Commerce, 1959: Hearings Before the Senate Select Committee on Small Business, 86th
Cong., 1st Sess. 1-356; SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, STATE TAXATION OF INCOME DERIVED
FROM INTERSTATE COMMERCE, S. REP. No. 658, 86th Cong., Ist Sess. 1-3, reprinted in 1959 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2548, 2549.
55. Hartman, supra note 45, at 359 (1976).
56. Tatarowicz, supra note 1, at 297. Justice Frankfurter was the first to espouse this opinion in
his dissent to Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 476 (1959).
Frankfurter believed that the result of Northwestern would be to subject small or medium sized
corporations doing exclusively interstate business to the burden of filing tax returns in many addi-
tional states. This requirement would in turn require corporations to stay informed of the tax laws
of all of the states in which they did business. Justice Frankfurter called for the development of a
Congressional policy to address the problems posed by the states expanding their taxing power.
57. Pub. L. No. 86-272, Title I, § 101, Sept. 14, 1959, 73 Stat. 555 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 381 (1982)).
58. Sweeney, supra note 9, at 175. The legislative history of Public Law 86-272 suggests that
Congress intended to adopt the holding in Northwestern States, but rejected the reach of the Louisi-
ana Supreme Court's decisions in Brown-Forman and International Shoe. See 105 CONo. REC.
16354 (1959); 1959 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 2548; 1 SPECIAL SUBCOMM. HOUSE JUDICI-
ARY COMM., STATE TAXATION OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE, H.R. REP. No. 1480, 88th Cong., 2d
Sess. 438-39 (1964) [hereinafter the Willis Report] § 201 and § 202 of Public Law 86-272 provided
for a study by the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives and the Committee
on Finance of the United States Senate pertaining to the taxation of interstate commerce by the
states. This commission conducted an exhaustive five year analysis of the states' taxing authority.
Despite this comprehensive undertaking, Congress failed to adopt the amendments recommended by
the commission. This Title was repealed by Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 2121(a), 90 Stat. 1914 (1976). See
15 U.S.C. § 381 (1976), Historical Note. Numerous attempts have been made to either amend the
language of Public Law 86-272, or to enact new state tax legislation, including bills proposing re-
strictions on State and local income, franchise, capital stock, gross receipts, and sales and use taxes.
HELLERSTEIN, supra note 1, S 6.17. For a summary of proposed legislation see Kust, State Taxation
of Interstate Business - An Obdurate Issue, 25 TAX EXECUriVE 143 (1973); Hellerstein, State Taxa-
tion Under the Commerce Clause: An Historical Perspective, 29 VAND. L. REV. 335 (1976); Mathias
Comm., Interstate Taxation: Hearings on S.2173 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th
Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. (1977-78); Byrd Comm., State Taxation of Interstate Commerce and World-
wide Corporate Income. Hearings on S.983 and S1688 Before the Subcomm. on Taxation and Debt
Management Generally of the Senate Comm. on Finance, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980).
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Rather than enumerating the activities that subject a foreign corpora-
tion to a state's taxing authority, Public Law 86-272 provides a minimal
jurisdictional standard below which the states may not impose a net in-
come tax.59 Under the broad language of the statute, states may not tax
foreign corporations engaged exclusively in interstate commerce as long
as the corporation:
1) limits its activities to the "solicitation of orders";
2) sends its orders out of state for approval; and
3) makes all deliveries from outside the state.60
If the corporation fails to satisfy any of these standards or if the corpora-
tion owns or leases real property in the state, then the state may tax the
corporation.61
The immunity provided by Public Law 86-272 depends largely on the
construction of the term "solicitation of orders".62 In the absence of
more explicit Congressional guidelines, the state courts have assumed the
59. Called the "solicitation law," this statute used what the Senate Report refers to as "a 'mini-
mum activities' type of approach." (Citing, S. REP. No. 658, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1959)). See
Sweeney, supra note 9, at 180 n.61.
Note also, that the subtitle for the first section of Public Law 86-272 is "Minimum Standards."
60. 15 U.S.C. § 381(a)(1) (1982). See supra note 66.
61. One scholar cautions:
"if a company does not obtain immunity from state taxation through Public Law 86-272,
the state may not automatically subject the company to taxation. Rather, the courts must
decide, based on established federal and state case law, whether the state can subject the
company's income derived from interstate commerce to taxation."
Sweeney, supra note 9, at 180-81.
62. HELLERSTEIN, supra note 1, 6.11.
The controversy stemming from Public Law 86-272 is due primarily to the statutes lack of gui-
dance in defining when the "solicitation" exemption applies. See Tatarowicz, supra note 1, at 293.
As noted above, see supra note 59, a congressionally authorized commission prepared recommen-
dations to provide guidelines for making these determinations. Unfortunately, this effort went for
naught, as the recommendations were never adopted. The following is a summary of the recommen-
dations contained in the Willis Report:
Activities which will not result in State income tax liability for a foreign corporation:
Usual or frequent activity in the State by employers soliciting orders without authority to
accept them, or engaging in some form of promotional activity, but not soliciting or taking
orders; solicitation activity by nonemployee representatives conducted through an office or
other business location in the State or usual or frequent solicitation activity by nonem-
ployee representatives; delivery of goods in the State in company-operated vehicles, regard-
less of frequency.
Activities which will result in state income tax liability for a foreign corporation:
Usual or frequent activity in the state by employees soliciting orders with authority to
accept them, or usual or frequent activity in the State by employees engaged in purchasing
activity or in the performance of services; the maintenance of any business location in the
State, including any kind of office; the ownership of real property in the State, or a stock of
goods in a public warehouse or in the hands of a distributor if used to fill orders for the
owner's account; the operation of mobile stores in the State.
Washington University Open Scholarship
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burden of providing the construction. 63  Predictably, the courts are di-
vided over the Act's proper interpretation.' Court decisions in Penn-
sylvania and Indiana are representative of a "broad" construction.65
"Solicitation" under these holdings exempts a corporation from a state's
net income tax when the corporation's activities in the state are limited to
requests for orders,6 6 acts "incidental" to such requests,67 and acts pre-
ceding requests.6" Conversely, Oregon narrowly interprets "solicita-
tion" 69 to exempt a corporation only when its activities are limited to
HELLERSTEIN, supra note 1, 6.10 (quoting the Willis Report, supra note 59).
The Willis Report essentially expanded on the Court's holding in Northwestern, incorporating
much of the factual background of that opinion. See supra notes 36-47 and accompanying text.
However, these recommendations retained the underlying focus of Public Law 86-272, which is to
categorize a business' activities, and to exempt that business from state net income tax if the business
does not engage in any "prohibited" activities. To a large degree, the state courts have created
judicial guidelines paralleling the recommendations of the Willis Report. However, the dividing line
between approved and prohibited activities varies from state to state, accounting for much of the
uncertainty surrounding Public Law 86-272; see infra notes 65-73 and accompanying text.
63. Tatarowicz, supra note 1, at 293.
64. "[Ihe state court decisions have wound a tortuous and serpentine path in defining 'solicita-
tion' and 'delivery.'" HARTMAN, supra note 1, % 9:10 (1981). For a thorough listing and discussion
of such cases see Tatarowicz, supra note 1, at 303-28.
The state court decisions can be categorized into a "broad" or "narrow" interpretation of the term
solicitation. Tatarowicz, supra note 1, at 303. Under the "broad" interpretation, the state courts
liberally interpret the immunity granted to corporations under the "solicitation law." In contrast,
the courts adopting a narrowing interpretation strictly construe the exemption.
65. See United States Tobacco Co. v. Commonwealth, 478 Pa. 125, 386 A.2d 471, cert. denied,
439 U.S. 880 (1979); see also Indiana Dep't. of Revenue v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 275 Ind. 378, 416
N.E.2d 1264 (1981), rev'g, 375 N.E.2d 1146 (Ind. 1978); but cf Indiana Dep't. of Revenue v. Conti-
nental Steel Corp., 399 N.E.2d 754 (Ind. App. 1980).
66. In United States Tobacco Co. v. Commonwealth, 478 Pa. 125, 386 A.2d 471 (1979), the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania exempted a New Jersey corporation engaged in the interstate sale of
tobacco products from Pennsylvania's corporate income tax. U.S. Tobacco Company maintained
missionary representatives in the state to call on wholesalers and retailers of the company's products.
These representatives forwarded orders from wholesalers to the company's office in Connecticut and
assisted retailers with displays. The company did not own or lease real property in the state. The
court held that "solicitation" is not restricted to the act of asking a customer to purchase a product.
Activities "inextricably related to solicitation" or "incidental" to asking for an order also fall within
the Pennsylvania court's rubric of the "solicitation laws" exemption. 478 Pa. at 140-41, 386 A.2d at
140-41.
67. Id.
68. The court in Indiana Dep't. of Revenue v. Continental Steel Corp. limited the "solicitation"
exemption to "those acts which lead to the placing of orders, " 399 N.E.2d at 759. However, the
Supreme Court of Indiana implicitly adopted the holding of US. Tobacco Co. in its more recent
decision in Indiana Dep't. of Revenue v. Kimberly-Clark.
69. Oregon has played the leading role in developing a narrow interpretation of "solicitation."
Powers, .L 86-272 and the Oregon Connection, 1 INTERSTATE TAX REPORT 3 (1981). Since 1965,
Oregon has issued seven opinions under the "solicitation law": Miles Laboratories, Inc. v. Depart-
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requests for orders.7°
The ironic result of the enactment of Public Law 86-272 and Congress'
subsequent failure to adopt proposed amendments has been a "diversity
of interpretations of a federal statute enacted to secure some semblance
of certainty. ' 71 Commentators have called for Congress to provide mul-
tistate corporations with strict guidelines so they can anticipate state in-
come tax consequences.72 Despite the uncertainty and confusion
surrounding Public Law 86-272, both Congress and the Supreme Court
have preferred to let the state courts individually fashion these guide-
lines.73 Although Public Law 86-272 remains intact despite a quarter
century of criticism, the deficiencies of the statute are pressing and de-
mand attention.74
II. TAXING A CORPORATION'S GROSS RECEIPTS
A. The Spector Doctrine
In contrast with its treatment of net income taxes, the Supreme Court
has only recently permitted states to tax the gross receipts of foreign cor-
porations.75 States historically imposed the gross receipts tax on corpo-
ment of Revenue, 274 Or. 395, 546 P.2d 1081 (1976); Olympia Brewing Co. v. Department of Reve-
nue, 277 Or. 309, 511 P.2d 837 (1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 976 (1974); Iron Fireman Mfg. Co. v.
State Tax Comm'n, 251 Or. 227, 445 P.2d 126 (1968); Briggs & Stratton Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 3
Or. T.R. 174 (1968); Hergg Jones Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 247 Or. 404, 430 P.2d 998 (1967); Cal-
Roof Wholesale, Inc. v. State Tax Comm'n, 242 Or. 435, 410 P.2d 233 (1966); Smith Kline &
French Laboratories v. State Tax Comm'n, 241 Or. 50, 403 P.2d 375 (1965). Smith Kline, Hergg
Jones, Briggs and Olympia involved foreign corporations engaging in activities in Oregon that sought
exemptions from Oregon's net income tax. The other three cases involved Oregon corporations that
sought to have their income apportioned in Washington on the basis that their activities in Washing-
ton exceeded "solicitation."
70. "[Slolicitation should be limited to those generally accepted or customary acts in the indus-
try which lead to the placing of orders, not those which follow as a natural result of the transaction
.." Miles Laboratories, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 274 Or. 395, 400, 546 P.2d 1081, 1082
(1976). Oregon distinguished exempt "solicitation" from non-exempt "solicitation" on the basis of
pre-sale versus post-sale activities.
71. Hartman, supra note 45, at 353. For a summary of the state judicial and administrative
interpretations of the "solicitation law," see Tatarowicz, supra note 1, at 293. See also HARTMAN,
supra note 1, II 9.11-9.14.
72. See, e.g., Sweeney, supra note 9, at 194-99.
73. Hartman, supra note 46, at 362; Tatarowicz, supra note 1, at 293.
74. See infra notes 128-39 and accompanying text.
75. See infra note I ll and accompanying text. The gross receipts tax is referred to as a "trans-
action" tax. States began to use transaction taxes in volume after 1932, in response to increasing
demands upon government. Dunham, Gross Receipts Taxes on Interstate Transactions, 47 COLUM.
L. REV. 211, 215 (1947).
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rations in exchange for the privilege of engaging in business activities
within the state.76 However, until 1976, the Supreme Court consistently
refused to permit states to expressly extend this tax to foreign
corporations.77
One may trace the Court's initial aversion to gross receipts taxes im-
posed on corporations engaged in interstate commerce to its decisions in
Fargo v. Michigan 7 and Philadelphia Steamship Co. v. Pennsylvania.9
In Steamship the State of Pennsylvania imposed a gross receipts tax on
the revenues Steamship Co. derived from transporting freight between
states.80 The Court found the tax invalid (despite Steamship being incor-
porated in Pennsylvania) because it conflicted with Congress' exclusive
power to regulate commerce between the states."1 For similar reasons,
the Court in Fargo invalidated a tax imposed by the State of Michigan.82
Michigan sought to impose a tax on the gross receipts Fargo derived
from engaging in business within the state.8 3 The court found that im-
posing the tax on Fargo, a New York based corporation shipping goods
into Michigan, unduly burdened interstate commerce."a These decisions
established the principle that gross receipts taxes levied on corporations
engaged in interstate commerce imposed a direct and impermissible bur-
den on commerce between the states.
Some sixty years later, the Court in Freeman v. Hewitt 5 forcefully
reaffirmed its opposition to the gross receipts tax imposed on foreign cor-
porations. The Freeman court recognized that subsequent to Fargo and
Steamship, the Court upheld a variety of taxes as legitimate means for a
state to recover the cost of enabling corporations to engage in business in
the taxing state.8 6 During this period, the Court affirmed states' author-
ity to tax manufacturing,8 7 property, 8 net income,8 9 consumption 90 and
76. See, e.g., Atlantic and Pacific Tele. Co. v. Philadelphia, 190 U.S. 160, 162 (1903).
77. See infra notes 79-110 and accompanying text.
78. 121 U.S. 230 (1887).
79. 122 U.S. 326 (1887).
80. Steamship, 122 U.S. at 327.
81. Id. at 347.
82. Fargo, 121 U.S. at 247.
83. Id. at 232.
84. Id. at 240.
85. 324 U.S. 249 (1946).
86. Id. at 255.
87. Utah Power & Light Co. v. Post, 286 U.S. 165 (1932); American Mfg. Co. v. St. Louis, 250
U.S. 459 (1919).
88. Virginia v. Imperial Sales Co., 293 U.S. 15, 19 (1934).
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licensees. 91 Consequently, in Freeman, Indiana sought to analogize to
these decisions to permit the imposition of a gross receipts tax on income
derived from interstate commerce. 92 The Court rejected Indiana's effort
by distinguishing the gross receipts tax from those taxes previously up-
held.93 The Court based this distinction on its belief that the gross re-
ceipts tax imposed a direct burden on interstate commerce, while the
other taxes imposed only indirect burdens.94
In Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. O'Connor95 the Supreme Court again
invalidated a gross receipts tax, but offered a varied rationale. In Spector
the State of Connecticut levied a gross receipts tax on a Missouri corpo-
ration engaged exclusively in the business of interstate freight transporta-
tion.96 Spector Motor objected to the tax, arguing that it violated the
Commerce Clause 97 The Court invalidated the tax not because it im-
posed an economic burden on interstate commerce, but because Connect-
icut levied it for the "privilege" of engaging in activities which were part
of interstate commerce. 98 Implicitly, the Court held that the gross re-
ceipts tax unconstitutionally permitted the states to regulate the basic
right of persons to engage in interstate commerce. 99 Ironically, this shift
in reasoning away from reliance on the economic burden on interstate
commerce ultimately lead to the Court upholding the gross receipts
tax.1to
89. See supra notes 14-32 and accompanying text.
90. McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Co., 309 U.S. 33, 58 (1940).
91. Cheney Brothers Co. v. Massachusetts, 246 U.S. 147 (1919); St. Louis S.W. Ry. v. Arkan-
sas, 235 U.S. 350, 364 (1914).
92. 329 U.S. at 255-58.
93. Id. at 256-59.
94. Id. at 256-57: "What makes the tax invalid is the fact that there is interference by a State
with the freedom of interstate commerce." This recognition that gross receipts taxes impose a direct
burden on interstate commerce was first noted by the Court in United States Glue Co. v. Oak Creek,
247 U.S. 321 (1918). The Court in United States Glue differentiated between the gross receipts tax
and the net income tax because states imposed the latter tax after interstate transactions were com-
pleted, while the former was imposed on the actual transaction (i.e., on every dollar of sales). See
supra note 24. After Freeman, this distinction was short-lived. See infra notes 96-101 and accompa-
nying text.
95. 340 U.S. 602 (1951).
96. Id. at 603.
97. Id. at 604. Spector Motor also objected to the tax on due process grounds. However, the
Court invalidated the tax under the commerce clause without addressing the due process issue.
98. Id. at 603, 607-10.
99. Id. at 610.
100. Prior to Spector, the only obstacle preventing the Court from upholding the gross receipts
tax was its belief that the tax imposed a direct burden on interstate commerce. See supra note 24.
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B. Narrowing the Spector Doctrine
Implicit in the Court's decisions following Spector was the realization
that states could make corporations pay their way when engaging in in-
terstate commerce.' 1 This realization required the Court to balance a
corporation's interest in freely engaging in interstate commerce against
the states' need to be compensated for enabling the commerce to take
place. As a result, the Court began to narrow the Spector doctrine to one
of draftsmanship and phraseology." 2 The Court increasingly upheld
state legislation that in form did not inhibit interstate commerce, but in
substance paralleled the taxes invalidated in Freeman and Spector.10 3
Most notably, in Railway Express Agency v. Virginia (Railway I),1 ° the
Court invalidated a "privilege" tax levied by Virginia on the gross re-
ceipts of interstate corporations.10 5 In response, the Virginia legislature
reworded the statute to remove the appearance of a tax on the privilege
of engaging in interstate commerce.1 0 6 The amended statute imposed a
tax on the value of a foreign corporation's "intangible property" within
the state, measured by the corporation's gross receipts. The apparent
effect of this statute was to continue to tax the corporation's gross re-
ceipts.107 Nevertheless, the Court upheld the statute in Railway Express
While the Court acknowledged during this era that states were justified in seeking to recover from
foreign corporations the cost of enabling interstate commerce to take place, see e.g., Western Live
Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250, 254 (1938) ("it was not the purpose of the commerce
clause to relieve those engaged in interstate commerce from their just share of the state tax burden
.. "), the Court required that recovery take the form of an indirect burden on commerce between
the states. In Spector, the Court unwittingly enabled itself, a quarter of a century later, to overcome
this direct burden obstacle. By focusing on the taxes' interference with the basic privilege to engage
in interstate commerce, rather than on its supposed economic burden on such commerce, the Court
implicitly shifted the analysis away from the commerce clause to the due process clause. Once this
shift became apparent, the Court began to uphold gross receipts taxes whenever taxes were fairly
apportioned and did not discriminate against interstate commerce. See infra note 110 and accompa-
nying text. However, it was not until Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1976),
that the Court expressly overruled Spector and gave its official blessing to gross receipts taxes. See
infra notes 111-20 and accompanying text.
101. See Complete Auto Transit v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 281 (1976); Western Live Stock v.
Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250, 254 (1938).
102. Complete Auto, 430 U.S. at 281 (citing Memphis Gas Co. v. Stone, 335 U.S. 80 (1948)).
103. State legislatures began to enact laws that levied taxes either on property maintained in the
taxing state by a foreign corporation (such as railroad cars), or on purely intrastate transactions
(such as the transportation of freight by an interstate railroad between two points within the state).
104. 347 U.S. 359 (1954).
105. Id. at 369.
106. See Complete Auto, 430 U.S. at 284.
107. Id. at 284.
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Agency, Inc. v. Virginia (Railway 11).'to
C. The Demise of Spector and the Rebirth of Nexus
During the two decades following Spector, the Court increasingly up-
held carefully worded gross receipts taxes but stopped short of disaffirm-
ing the Spector doctrine."° This reluctance yielded in Complete Auto
Transit, Inc. v. Brady 10 when a unanimous Court rejected the holding in
Spector that a state tax on the privilege of doing business is per se uncon-
stitutional when applied to interstate commerce. 1' In Complete Auto
Mississippi sought to impose a gross receipts tax on a Michigan corpora-
tion engaged in the transportation of motor vehicles.I 2 The motor vehi-
cles were manufactured in Michigan and shipped by rail to
Mississippi." 3 From there, Complete Auto transported the vehicles to
dealerships in Mississippi." 4 Complete Auto claimed that because its
transport was only one part of an interstate movement, Mississippi's tax
violated Spector's prohibition against taxing the privilege of engaging in
interstate commerce.' 15
The Court in Complete Auto harshly criticized Spector and its progeny,
finding that the formalism of Spector obscured the "question whether the
tax produces a forbidden effect."' 6 However, the Court implicitly" 7 ap-
108. 358 U.S. 434,441 (1959) (Railway II). The Court in Railway HI recognized that the Spector
doctrine had created a situation where an "otherwise constitutional levy" could be "disable[d]" by
the improper use of words or labels. Id.
109. See, e.g., Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Traigle, 421 U.S. 100, 114 (1975) ("The tax cannot be said
to be imposed ... merely or solely for the privilege of doing interstate business ... It is, a fairly
apportioned and nondiscriminatory means of requiring appellant to pay it's just share of the cost of
state government.. ."); Standard Pressed Steel Co. v. Dep't. of Revenue of Washington, 419 U.S.
560, 562 (1975) (Court found that the question posed in Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney, 311 U.S. 435
(1940), in the present case verged on the "frivolous". See supra note 35 for a discussion J.C. Pen-
ney); General Motors Corp. v. Washington, 377 U.S. 436, 440 (1964) ("it is well established that
taxation measured by gross receipts is constitutionally proper if it is fairly apportioned." The Court
distinguished Spector by implying that the State of Washington did not impose its tax for the privi-
lege of doing interstate commerce. Id. at 447).
110. 430 U.S. 274 (1976).
111. Id. at 288.
112. Id. at 276-77.
113. Id. at 276.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 277-78.
116. Id. at 288. The Court found that under the Spector doctrine, there was no relationship
between the decisions of the courts and the economic realities of the taxes under review. Id. at 279.
117. The Court's analysis did not proceed beyond the reversal of Spector because Complete Auto
alleged only that the tax was invalid based on the holding in Spector. Id. at 288.
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proved of the use of a four-part test to review the legality of gross receipts
taxes.1 18 This test focuses primarily on whether a nexus sufficient to jus-
tify imposing a tax exists between the foreign corporation and the taxing
state. The Court declined to decide whether such a nexus was present in
Complete Auto." 9 However, its reference to this test implied that future
decisions reviewing the legality of gross receipts taxes would entail an
inquiry into the corporations's activities as a whole within the taxing
state.
D. Tyler Pipe" A Further Articulation of the Nexus Test
In Tyler Pipe Industries, Inc. v. Dept. of Revenue 2 the Court articu-
lated it's definition of "nexus": "[W]hether the activities performed in
this state on behalf of the taxpayer are significantly associated with the
taxpayer's ability to establish and maintain a market in this state for the
sales"1'' (emphasis added). Tyler, a Texas based manufacturer of steel
pipe, conducted business in the State of Washington through an in-
dependent contractor.' 22 Tyler did not maintain an inventory of pipe in
Washington,' 23 nor did it own or lease property in the state. 124 Tyler
did, however, derive revenue in excess of $22 million from the state. 125
The Court found that the activities engaged in by Tyler's independent
contractors were so significant, and so substantial that they justified
Washington's imposition of a gross receipts tax.1 26 This focus on the
118. Id. at 287. The four elements of this test are: 1) whether the foreign corporation has a
sufficient nexus with the state; 2) whether the tax discriminates against interstate commerce;
3) whether the tax is unfairly apportioned; and 4) whether the tax is unrelated to services provided
by the state. For the origins of these factors, respectively, see Boston Stock Exchange v. State Tax
Comm'n, 429 U.S. 318 (1977); General Motors Corp. v. Washington, 377 U.S. 436 (1964); Illinois
Central R. Co. v. Minnesota, 309 U.S. 157 (1940); Ingels v. Morf, 300 U.S. 290 (1937).
119. 430 U.S. at 287. The Court noted Complete Auto did not allege that it's activities were not
"sufficiently connected to the State to justify a tax, or that the tax [was] not fairly related to the
benefits provided the taxpayer, or that the tax discriminate[d] against interstate commerce, or that
the tax [was] not fairly apportioned." Id.
120. 107 S. Ct. 2810 (1987).
121. Id. at 215.
122. Brief for Appellant at 3-9, Tyler Pipe Industries v. Department of Revenue, 107 S. Ct. 2810
(1987).
123. Id.
124. Tyler Pipe, 107 S. Ct. at 2821.
125. Brief for Appellant at 3.
126. Tyler Pzpe, 107 S. Ct. at 2821-22. The activities carried out by the independent contractors
on behalf of Tyler which apparently formed this nexus included: 1) keeping track of and advising
Tyler about the local market conditions in Washington; 2) calling on wholesalers of Tyler's products
and soliciting orders from these wholesalers; 3) handling customer complaints; 4) evaluating a pro-
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corporation's activities as a whole (rather than on the type of activity, as
the courts apply under Public Law 86-272) established a straightforward
approach to determine when the imposition of a gross receipts tax is
justified.
III. PROPOSAL
The state courts' conflicting interpretations under Public Law 86-272
prevent corporate administrators from accurately predicting whether a
state has the authority to tax corporate net income. This confusion and
uncertainty would be reduced by incorporating into the statute the
"nexus" test articulated by the Supreme Court. Essentially, the Court
upheld the gross receipts tax in Complete Auto for the same reason it
sanctioned the net income tax in Northwestern States Cement; the Court
recognized that it is only fair that foreign corporations be made to pay
for the right to engage in interstate business. 127 Given these complimen-
tary rationales, it is inconsistent for the courts to focus on a corporation's
activities as a whole when evaluating whether a state may impose a gross
receipts tax, while focusing on the type of activities when evaluating
whether a state may tax net income.
The inability of Public Law 86-272 to address the concerns expressed
by Congress in enacting the law is demonstrated by the following hy-
potheticals. Consider foreign corporation "X", a large business engaged
in interstate commerce involving state "Y". Assume state Y imposes a
tax on the net income of corporations carrying out business within its
borders. Under Public Law 86-272, corporation X may avoid state Y's
net income tax by carefully restricting the scope of its salesman's activi-
ties to "solicitation", 2 ' as defined by that state's judiciary. Theoreti-
cally, corporation X may derive millions of dollars of revenue as a result
of activities carried out in the state, and yet, if the corporation carefully
engineers its agents activities, it will be under no obligation to pay state
Y's income tax.
Consider next foreign corporation "Z", a small business engaging in
an insignificant volume of transactions within state Y. If the business
owns or leases a small office in the state, permits salesmen to approve
orders while soliciting in the state, or even makes customer deliveries
spective customer's financial position; and 5) maintaining valuable customer relationships. Brief for
Appellant at 3-9, Tyler Pipe Indus., Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 107 S. Ct. 2810 (1987).
127. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
128. See supra notes 63-71 and accompanying text.
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from an inventory pool located within the state, 129 Z's activities may
exceed Y's definition of "solicitation" and Y will tax Z.
The above hypotheticals point out the problems with Public Law 86-
272. Under the Law, a large corporation such as X can use its superior
financial resources and legal advice to protect itself from the state taxes
that Congress intended it to pay. 130 Conversely, the small business such
as Z, the very individual Congress sought to protect by enacting Public
Law 86-272, generally will not have such resources. As a result, a
state may legitimately tax a business which derives only incidental bene-
fits from the state, yet a business which derives significant and substantial
revenues from the state (an indice of benefit) may completely avoid that
same tax.
In enacting Public Law 86-272, Congress also was concerned with the
burden on small businesses of filing multiple state tax returns.132 Con-
gress' solution was to exempt corporations engaged in mere "solicita-
tion" from state net income taxation. 133 As the above hypotheticals
indicate, Public Law 86-272 may not alleviate the burden imposed on
small businesses engaging in interstate commerce, because these busi-
nesses lack the financial resources to interpret the law in a cost efficient
manner. What Public Law 86-272 did accomplish, however, was to cre-
ate a loophole through which carefully counseled corporations can avoid
multistate net income taxation.
The development of tax guidelines focusing on a corporation's activi-
ties as a whole within the state, as opposed to an inquiry into the type of
activities, would more adequately address congressional concerns with
respect to small businesses. The test that courts should use to review the
legality of both the gross receipts as well as net income taxes is whether a
foreign corporation has engaged in such activities within a state that it
may legitimately require the corporation to compensate the state. 134 If a
corporation's activities as a whole have been so significant and so sub-
stantial as to enable it to establish a market in the taxing state, then the
state should have authority to tax the corporation's receipts and net
income.
129. See supra note 66.
130. Sweeney, supra note 9, at 173-75.
131. Id.
132. See supra note 57; see also Sweeney, supra note 9, at 173-75.
133. See supra notes 58-62 and accompanying text.
134. This test should adopt the language of the Court's opinion in Tyler Pipe. See supra notes
121-27 and accompanying text.
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Numerous commentators have called for revisions to the "solicitation
law."13 None of these commentators have focused on incorporating the
nexus standard articulated by the Supreme Court for gross receipts taxa-
tion. To reduce the confusion surrounding the "solicitation law" since
its enactment, this Note calls for such a revision. Specifically:
1. Congress should revise Public Law 86-272 to expressly authorize the
states to tax both net income and gross receipts of corporations engaged
purely in interstate commerce;
2. Congress should replace the statute's focus on the type of activity (pro-
viding an exemption for mere solicitation) with language focusing on fre-
quency of activity, measured by whether a sufficient nexus exists between
the corporation and the state;
3. The language of the statute should underscore the Court's rationale in
permitting the states to tax the gross receipts and net income, which is to
compensate the states for enabling interstate commerce to take place.
The above recommendations provide only rudimentary guidelines.
Congress should supplement these guidelines with examples of activities
which it deems so substantial and so significant as to justify imposition of
either a gross receipts tax or a net income tax.1 36 To address the con-
cerns of small businesses, Congress should also consider incorporating
into the statute an exemption from a state's net income tax for those
businesses which derive less than a set amount of revenues. 37 By adopt-
135. See, eg., Sweeney, supra note 9, at 194-99; Hartman, supra note 45. As an alternative to
amending the language of P.L. 86-272 to achieve more certainty in state taxation of foreign corpora-
tions, a more equitable approach to resolving this uncertainty may be to focus on enunciating worka-
ble guidelines for allocating taxable income among various states. while there is merit to this
approach, this author believes the lack of progress made by the states in recent years in agreeing to
such guidelines brings into question the states willingness to sacrifice any degree of their taxing
autonomy.
136. The factors enumerated in Tyler Pipe, see supra note 127, should provide the framework for
these proposed guidelines. Congress should also give consideration to the recommendations of the
Willis Report, supra note 59. In short, these guidelines must emphasize the corporation's activities as
a whole, in contrast with the current emphasis on the type of activities engaged in by the corpora-
tion.
Of course, challenges made to a state's net income tax under the proposed revisions to Public Law
86-272 will be resolved on a case-by-case basis, as they are today. However, by providing more
comprehensive guidelines regarding the state's authority to tax, this author believes that the fre-
quency of these disputes will be reduced.
137. For the sake of analysis, assume that Congress establishes such a floor at $100,000. If a
business grossing just under $100,000 a year in a state (which taxes net income at a rate of 5%) was
exempt from that state's taxing authority, the loss to the state would be approximately $500.00
(assuming the business operates on a 10% profit margin). The insignificance of this loss is reflected
in the fact that this business will probably have expended many thousands of dollars in the state
(with retailers, merchants, suppliers, advertisers, etc.) in order to generate that $100,000 in revenue.
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ing these recommendations, Congress will enable a corporate tax planner
to better anticipate when his corporation will be subject to a state's tax-
ing authority.
Mark R. Nethers
These expenditures provide a much more immediate benefit to the citizens of the state than a mere
$500.00 in tax revenue.
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